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MICHELE LOMBARDI AND ROBERTO VENEZIANI
Abstract. This paper extends the analysis of liberal principles in so-
cial choice recently proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani ([6]) to societies
with an in￿nite number of agents. First, a novel characterisation of the
inegalitarian leximax social welfare relation is provided based on the In-
dividual Bene￿t Principle, which incorporates a liberal, non-interfering
view of society. This result is surprising because the IBP has no obvious
anti-egalitarian content. Second, it is shown that there exists no weakly
complete social welfare relation that satis￿es simultaneously the stan-
dard axioms of Finite Anonymity, Strong Pareto, and Weak Continuity,
and a liberal principle of Non-Interference that generalises IBP.
JEL classi￿cation. D63 (Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Norma-
tive Criteria and Measurement); D70 (Analysis of Collective Decision-
Making); Q01 (Sustainable development).
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1. Introduction
Liberal principles in philosophy and social choice tend to express some no-
tion of individual autonomy or freedom. In a recent contribution, Mariotti
and Veneziani ([6]) have proposed a new axiom - called the Harm Princi-
ple (HP) - suited for Social Welfare Orderings (swos), which is meant to
capture a liberal view of non-interference. The basic content of HP can
be illustrated as follows: consider two welfare allocations u and v such that
u is socially preferred to v, and two di⁄erent welfare allocations u0 and v0
such that agent i is worse o⁄ at these than at the corresponding starting
allocations, the other agents are equally well o⁄, and agent i prefers u0 to v0.
Whatever the origin of the decrease in agent i￿ s welfare, HP requires that
society￿ s preference over u0 and v0 should agree with person i￿ s preferences:
having already su⁄ered a welfare loss in both allocations, and given that
no other agent is a⁄ected, agent i should not be punished in the swo by
changing social preferences against her.
Although HP incorporates no egalitarian content, Mariotti and Veneziani
([6]) have shown that, together with the standard axioms of Anonymity
and Strong Pareto, it characterises the leximin swo in societies with a ￿-
nite number of agents. Lombardi and Veneziani ( [5]) have generalised this
counterintuitive result by weakening HP and, based on the weak HP, they
have provided novel characterisations of various swos related to Rawls￿ s
di⁄erence principle, including the maximin and the ￿ recursive maximin￿re-
cently proposed by Roemer ([8],[9]). They have also used the weak HP to
characterise the leximin social welfare relation (swr) as de￿ned by Asheim
and Tungodden ([1]) in economies with an in￿nite number of agents. The
latter result is particularly relevant because the analysis of societies with
an in￿nite number of agents is of focal interest, especially in the discussion
of intergenerational justice, but impossibility results easily obtain, for there
exists no swo that satis￿es Anonymity and Strong Pareto (see [4]).
This paper extends the analysis of liberal, non-interfering views in soci-
eties with an in￿nite number of agents in two main directions. First, the
Individual Bene￿t Principle (IBP) - proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani
([7]) in economies with a ￿nite number of agents - is analysed. The IBP
also incorporates a liberal, noninterfering view of society and it can be takenAN IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE RELATIONS 3
as the theoretical complement of HP, for it requires society not to switch so-
cial preferences when agent i￿ s welfare in both allocations u and v increases.
Although it has no obvious inegalitarian content, we show that a weaker
version of IBP suitable for swrs in in￿nitely-lived societies, together with
other standard axioms, provides a novel characterisation of the inegalitarian
leximax swr. This result generalises the characterisation of the leximax
swo in ￿nite societies in ([7]).
Second, as noted by ([7]), HP and IBP can be taken as two parts of a sin-
gle liberal view and a weaker version of the principle of Non-Interference ([7])
is proposed, which is suitable for swrs in societies with an in￿nite number
of agents. An interesting impossibility result for liberal approaches is de-
rived, according to which there exists no weakly complete swr that satis￿es
Finite Anonymity, Strong Pareto Optimality, Weak Preference Continuity,
and Non-Interference.
2. The framework
Let X ￿ RN be the set of countably in￿nite utility streams, where R is
the set of real numbers and N is the set of natural numbers. An element of
X is 1u = (u1;u2;:::) and, for t 2 N, ut is the utility level of a representative
member of generation t. For T 2 N, 1uT = (u1;:::;uT) denotes the T-
head of 1u and T+1u = (uT+1;uT+2;:::) denotes the T-tail of 1u, so that
1u = (1uT;T+1 u). We write con￿ for the stream of constant level of well-
being equal to ￿ 2 R. A permutation ￿ is a bijective mapping of N on itself.
A permutation ￿ of N is ￿nite whenever there is T 2 N such that ￿(t) = t





be a permutation of 1u. For any T 2 N and 1u 2 X, 1￿ uT is a permutation
of 1uT such that the components are ranked in ascending order (i.e., ￿ u1 6
￿ u2 6 ::: 6 ￿ uT).
For any two utility paths 1u;1 v, we write 1u ￿ 1v to mean ut ￿ vt for all
t 2 N; 1u > 1v to mean 1u ￿ 1v and 1u 6= 1v; and 1u ￿ 1v to mean ut > vt
for all t 2 N.
Let < be a (binary) relation over X. For any 1u;1 v 2 X, we write 1u < 1v
for (1u;1 v) 2< and 1u 6< 1v for (1u; 1v) = 2<; < stands for ￿at least as good
as￿ . For any 1u;1 v 2 X, the asymmetric factor ￿ of < is de￿ned by 1u ￿ 1v
if and only if 1u < 1v and 1v 6< 1u, and the symmetric part s of < is de￿ned4 MICHELE LOMBARDI AND ROBERTO VENEZIANI
by 1u s 1v if and only if 1u < 1v and 1v < 1u. They stand, respectively,
for ￿strictly better than￿and ￿indi⁄erent to￿ . A relation < on X is said to
be: re￿exive if, for any 1u 2 X, 1u < 1u; complete if, for any 1u; 1v 2 X,
1u 6= 1v implies 1u < 1v or 1v < 1u; transitive if, for any 1u;1 v;1 w 2 X,
1u < 1v < 1w implies 1u < 1w. < is a quasi-ordering if it is re￿ exive and
transitive, while < is an ordering if it is a complete quasi-ordering. Let <
and <0 be relations on X. <0 is an extension of < if <￿<0 and ￿￿￿0.
3. The Harm Principle and the Leximin SWR
The standard de￿nition of the leximin swr used in the literature to com-
pare (countably) in￿nite utility streams is due to Asheim and Tungodden
([1]).
De￿nition 3.1. (De￿nition 2, [1], p. 224) For all 1u;1 v 2 X, 1u ￿LM
1v , 9~ T ￿ 1 such that 8T ￿ ~ T: 1￿ uT = 1￿ vT, and 1u ￿LM
1v , 9~ T ￿ 1 such
that, 8T ￿ ~ T , 9t 2 f1;:::;Tg with ￿ us = ￿ vs (81 ￿ s < t) and ￿ ut > ￿ vt.
The characterisation of the leximin derived by ([5]) focuses on de￿nition
3.1, and it is based on the following axioms.1
Finite Anonymity, FA: 81u 2 X and 8 ￿nite permutation ￿ of N, ￿(1u) ￿
1u.
Strong Pareto Optimality, SPO: 81u;1 v 2 X : 1u > 1v ) 1u ￿ 1v.
Weak Preference Continuity, WPC: 81u;1 v 2 X : 9~ T ￿ 1 such that
(1uT;T+1 v) ￿ 1v 8T ￿ ~ T ) 1u ￿ 1v.
Weak Completeness, WC: 81u; 1v 2 X, 9T ￿ 1 ￿(1uT;T+1 v) 6= 1v 8
￿nite permutation ￿ of N ) (1uT;T+1 v) < 1v or 1v < (1uT;T+1 v).
Harm Principle, HP: 81u;1 v;1 u0;1 v0 2 X : 9T ￿ 1 1u = (1uT;T+1 v) ￿
1v, and 1u0 and 1v0 are such that, 9i ￿ T,
1De￿nition 3.1 is also known as the W-Leximin ([1], p.224). [5] also provide a char-
acterisation of the S-Leximin ( [1], p.224) and of the leximin swr as de￿ned by ([2]).






j = uj 8j 6= i
v0
j = vj 8j 6= i
implies 1u0 < 1v0 whenever u0
i > v0
i.
FA and SPO are standard and need no further comment. WPC has been
proposed by Asheim and Tungodden ([1], p. 223) and it represents a mainly
technical, weak requirement to deal with in￿nite-dimensional vectors. WC
states that a swr should be able to compare vectors with the same tail: this
seems an obviously desirable property, as it imposes a minimum requirement
of completeness. Finally, HP formalises the Harm Principle in societies with
an in￿nite number of agents. It is weaker than the version proposed by ([7]),
because it does not require that 1u0 ￿ 1v0 and moreover it only holds for
vectors with the same tail.2 Lombardi and Veneziani ([5]) have proved the
following Theorem.
Theorem 3.2. (Theorem 3.5, [5], p. 12) < is an extension of <LMif and
only if % satis￿es FA, SPO, HP, WPC, and WC.
As noted in [6] and [5], a characterisation of the leximin based on HP
is surprising, because HP has no obvious egalitarian content, unlike the
standard axiom of Hammond Equity (see, e.g., [3], and [1]). It is also quite
surprising that, by a suitable change in the axiom incorporating a liberal
view of non-interference, it is possible to characterise the strongly inegali-
tarian leximax swr.
4. The Benefit Principle and the Leximax SWR
According to the leximax, that society is best which (lexicographically)
maximises the welfare of its best-o⁄members. In economies with an in￿nite
number of agents, this intuition can be formalised as follows.
De￿nition 4.1. For all 1u;1 v 2 X, 1u ￿LX
1v , 9~ T ￿ 1 such that 8T ￿ ~ T:
1￿ uT = 1￿ vT, and 1u ￿LX
1v , 9~ T ￿ 1 such that, 8T ￿ ~ T , 9t 2 f1;:::;Tg
with ￿ us = ￿ vs (8t < s ￿ T) and ￿ ut > ￿ vt.
2For a detailed discussion of the axioms, see ([5]).6 MICHELE LOMBARDI AND ROBERTO VENEZIANI
In order to characterise the leximax swr, the same axioms as for the
leximin are used, except for HP, which is substituted with the Individual
Bene￿t Principle. The IBP also captures a liberal requirement of noninter-
ference and can be formalised as follows.
Individual Benefit Principle, IBP:81u;1 v;1 u0;1 v0 2 X : 9T ￿ 1






j = uj 8j 6= i
v0
j = vj 8j 6= i
implies 1u0 < 1v0 whenever u0
i > v0
i.
In other words, consider two alternatives 1u and 1v, whereby 1u is socially
preferred to 1v, and two di⁄erent welfare allocations 1u0 and 1v0 such that
agent i is better o⁄ at these than at the corresponding starting allocations,
the other agents are equally well-o⁄, and i prefers 1u0 to 1v0. IBP requires
that society￿ s preference over 1u0 and 1v0 should agree with person i￿ s prefer-
ences: although i￿ s welfare has increased in both allocations, society should
not ￿ punish￿i by reversing social preferences. The moral intuition behind
IBP is similar to the HP, and yet the next Theorem proves that the IBP
leads to an extremely di⁄erent result.
Theorem 4.2. < is an extension of <LXif and only if < satis￿es FA, SPO,
IBP, WPC, and WC.
Proof. ()) Let <LX￿<. It is easy to see that < meets FA, SPO, WPC,
and WC. We show that < satis￿es IBP. Take any 1u; 1v; 1u0; 1v0 2 X such
that 1u = (1uT;T+1 v) ￿ 1v 9T ￿ 1, and 1u0, 1v0 are such that, 9i ￿ T,
u0
i > ui, v0
i > vi, u0
j = uj 8j 6= i, v0
j = vj 8j 6= i. We show that 1u0 < 1v0
whenever u0
i > v0
i. As 1u, 1v have the same tail, 1u ￿ LX
1v. Then, 9~ T ￿ 1
such that, 8T0 ￿ ~ T, 9t 2 f1;:::;T0g with ￿ us = ￿ vs 8t < s ￿ T0 and ￿ ut > ￿ vt.
Consider any T0 ￿ ~ T. If ￿ uT0 > ￿ vT0, the result follows as ￿ u0
T0 2 fu0
i; ￿ uT0g and
￿ v0
T0 2 fv0
i; ￿ vT0g. Therefore suppose ￿ uT0 = ￿ vT0. If ￿ v‘ = ￿ v0
‘ for all t ￿ ‘ ￿ T0,
the result follows. Otherwise, let ￿ v‘ 6= ￿ v0
‘ for some t ￿ ‘ ￿ T0. We distinguishAN IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE RELATIONS 7
two cases.
Case 1. ￿ vt < v0
i < ￿ vt+1
Then, ￿ v0
t+1 > ￿ v0
t = v0
i > ￿ vt and ￿ v0





i = ￿ v0
t. Otherwise, let u0
i > ￿ ut+1. Thus, there exists j ￿ t + 1
such that u0
i = ￿ u0
j > ￿ uj. Let
m = max
￿
t + 1 ￿ j ￿ T0j￿ u0




j = ￿ vj = ￿ uj 8t < j ￿ T0 it follows that ￿ u0
m > ￿ v0
m. In both cases,
there exists t￿ ￿ T0 such that ￿ u0
s = ￿ v0
s 8t￿ < s ￿ T0 and ￿ u0
t￿ > ￿ v0
t￿.
Case 2. v0
i ￿ ￿ vt+1
If v0
i ￿ ￿ vT0, then ￿ u0
T0 > ￿ v0
T0 as u0
i > v0
i. Otherwise, let v0
i < ￿ vT0. Let
‘ = min
￿
t + 1 < j ￿ T0jv0
i < ￿ vj
￿
.
Then, ￿ v‘ > v0
i = ￿ v0
‘￿1 ￿ ￿ u‘￿1 = ￿ v‘￿1. As v0
i < u0
i, it follows that u0
i > ￿ u‘￿1.
If u0
i 2 (￿ u‘￿1; ￿ u‘], then ￿ v0
‘￿1 < u0
i = ￿ u0
‘￿1. Otherwise, let ￿ u‘ < u0
i. Then,
there exists ‘ ￿ m ￿ T0 such that ￿ v0
m = ￿ vm < ￿ u0
m = u0
i and if m < T0,
￿ u0
s = ￿ v0
s 8m < s ￿ T0. In both cases, there exists t￿ ￿ T0 such that
￿ u0
s = ￿ v0
s 8t￿ < s ￿ T0 and ￿ u0
t￿ > ￿ v0
t￿.
Since it holds for any T0 ￿ ~ T, we have that 1u0 < 1v0 as <LX￿<.
(() Suppose that < satis￿es FA, SPO, IBP, WPC, and WC. We show
that ￿LX￿
￿￿ and ￿LX￿
￿￿. Take any 1u; 1v 2 X. If 1u ￿LX
1v, then
T+1u = T+1v 8T > ~ T, so FA implies 1u ￿ 1v.
Next, we show that 1u ￿ 1v whenever 1u ￿LX
1v. Thus, suppose that
1u ￿LX
1v. Take any T ￿ ~ T and consider the vector 1w ￿ (1uT;T+1 v):
We want to show that 1w ￿ 1v. By FA and transitivity, we can consider
1 ￿ w ￿ (1￿ uT;T+1 v) and 1￿ v ￿ (1￿ vT;T+1 v) . Suppose that 1￿ v < 1 ￿ w. We
distinguish two cases.
Case 1. 1￿ v ￿ 1 ￿ w
By SPO it follows that ￿ vl > ￿ wl, some l < t ￿ T: Let
k = maxf1 ￿ l < tj￿ vl > ￿ wlg:
By FA, let wi = ￿ wk and vi = ￿ vk+g for some 0 < g ￿ t￿k with ￿ wk+g > ￿ vk+g.
Let d1;d2 > 0, and consider vectors 1w0; 1v0 formed from 1 ￿ w; 1￿ v as follows:
￿ vk+g is raised to ￿ vk+g+d1 such that ￿ wk+g > ￿ vk+g+d1; ￿ wk is raised to ￿ wk+d2
such that ￿ vk+g + d1 > ￿ wk + d2 > ￿ vk; and all other entries of 1 ￿ w and 1￿ v are8 MICHELE LOMBARDI AND ROBERTO VENEZIANI
unchanged. By FA, consider 1 ￿ w0 = (1 ￿ w0
T;T+1 v) and 1￿ v0 = (1￿ v0
T;T+1 v). By
construction ￿ w0
j ￿ ￿ v0
j for all T ￿ j ￿ k, with ￿ w0
k+g > ￿ v0
k+g and ￿ w0
k > ￿ v0
k.
IBP implies 1￿ v0 < 1 ￿ w0, and by SPO d1;d2 can be chosen so that 1￿ v0 ￿ 1 ￿ w0,
without loss of generality. Consider two cases:
a) Suppose that ￿ vk > ￿ wk, but ￿ wl ￿ ￿ vl for all l < k. It follows that 1 ￿ w0 >
1￿ v0, and so SPO implies that 1 ￿ w0 ￿ 1￿ v0, a contradiction.
b) Suppose that ￿ vl > ￿ wl for some l < k. Note that by construction ￿ v0
l = ￿ vl
and ￿ w0
l = ￿ wl for all l < k. Then, let
k0 = maxf1 ￿ l < kj￿ v0
l > ￿ w0
lg.
The above argument can be applied to 1 ￿ w0; 1￿ v0 to derive vectors 1 ￿ w00; 1￿ v00
such that ￿ w00
j ￿ ￿ v00
j for all j ￿ k0, whereas by IBP and SPO 1￿ v00 ￿ 1 ￿ w00.
And so on. After a ￿nite number of iterations q, two vectors 1 ￿ wq; 1￿ vq can
be derived such that, by IBP and SPO, 1￿ vq ￿ 1 ￿ wq but, by SPO, 1 ￿ wq ￿
1￿ vq, yielding the desired contradiction.
Case 2. 1￿ v ￿ 1 ￿ w
By assumption, ￿ vt < ￿ ut ￿ ￿ wt. Therefore, de￿ne 1 ￿ w0 as follows: ￿ w0
￿ = ￿ w￿
8￿ 2 Nnftg and ￿ w0
t = ￿ wt ￿ ￿ > ￿ vt, some ￿ > 0. By SPO and transitivity,
it follows that 1￿ v ￿ 1 ￿ w0 but 1 ￿ w0 ￿LX
1￿ v. Hence, the argument of Case 1
above can be applied to 1￿ v and 1 ￿ w0, yielding the desired contradiction.
As 1￿ v 6< 1 ￿ w WC implies 1 ￿ w ￿ 1￿ v. FA and transitivity imply that (1uT;
T+1v) ￿ 1v. Since this is true for any T ￿ ~ T, WPC implies 1u ￿ 1v. ￿
Theorem 4.2 has an interesting theoretical implication. Consider the fol-
lowing axiom of Non-Interference, which incorporates the normative intu-
itions behind HP and IBP in a uni￿ed liberal framework, and generalises
the principle of Non-Interference proposed by ([7]) to economies with an
in￿nite number of agents.
Non-Interference, NI:81u;1 v;1 u0;1 v0 2 X : 9T ￿ 1 1u = (1uT;T+1 v) ￿










j = uj 8j 6= i
v0
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implies 1u0 < 1v0 whenever u0
i > v0
i.
As is well-known, there exists no swo de￿ned on an in￿nite bounded set
of real vectors which satis￿es Anonymity and SPO (see, [4]). Theorems 3.2
and 4.2 imply that there is no weakly complete swr that satis￿es FA, SPO,
WPC, and NI.
Theorem 4.3. There exists no swr on X that satis￿es FA, SPO, WPC,
WC and NI.
Proof. By contradiction. Let ￿;￿ 2 R with ￿ > ￿ and consider vectors
1u,1v 2 X such that 1u = con￿ and 1v = (v1; 2v), where v1 < ￿ and
2v = con￿ . By Theorem 3.2, 1u ￿LM
1v, so that 1u ￿ 1v, but by Theorem
4.2, 1v ￿LX
1u, so that 1v ￿ 1u, a contradiction. ￿
Conclusions
This paper analyses liberal axioms for swrs in societies with an in￿nite
number of agents. The leximax swr is characterised by appealing to the
Individual Bene￿t Principle, which incorporates a liberal, non-interfering
view of society. This result is interesting per se, since it provides the ￿rst
characterisation of the leximax in economies with an in￿nite number of
agents, and because the IBP has no obvious anti-egalitarian content. It
also has relevant implications for liberal approaches to social choice. For it
allows us to show that there exists no weakly complete swr that satis￿es the
standard axioms of Finite Anonymity, Strong Pareto, a weak requirement
on continuity, and the liberal principle of Non-Interference.
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Let ￿ be the set of all ￿nite permutations.
For an example violating only FA, de￿ne < on X in the following way: 81x; 1y 2
X
1) 1x = 1y ) 1x ￿ 1y
2) 1x 6= 1y and 1x = ￿ (1y)9￿ 2 ￿ : 1u 6< 1v and 1v 6< 1u
3) 1x 6= 1y and 1x 6= ￿ (1y)8￿ 2 ￿: 1x <LX
￿
1y ) 1x < 1y.
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr <LX
￿
. The swr < on X
satis￿es all properties except FA.
For an example violating only SPO, for all 1x; 1y 2 X, de￿ne < on X in the
following way: 1x ￿ 1y. The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximax swr
<LX
￿
. Clearly, the swr < on X satis￿es all properties except SPO.
For an example violating only WC, for all 1x,1y 2 X, de￿ne < on X in the
following way: 1x ￿ 1y if 1x > ￿ ( 1y)9￿ 2 ￿; 1x ￿ 1y if 1x = ￿ (1y)9￿ 2 ￿; and
1x 6< 1y and 1y 6< 1x if 1x 6> ￿ (1y), 1y 6> ￿ (1x), and 1x 6= ￿ (1y) 8￿ 2 ￿. The
swr < on X is not an extension of the leximax swr <LX
￿
. Clearly, the swr < on
X satis￿es all properties except WC.
For an example violating only WPC, de￿ne < on X in the following way:
81x; 1y 2 X




1y ) 1x < 1y.
< on X is a swr. Fix ￿;￿;￿;￿ 2 R, with ￿ > ￿ > ￿ > ￿. Let 1x = (￿; con￿)
and 1y = (￿; con￿). Clearly, 1x; 1y 2 X, and (1yT; T+1x) ￿LX
￿
1x 8T ￿ 2,
1y ￿LX
￿
1x, but 1x 6< 1y and 1y 6< 1x. It follows that the swr < on X is not
an extension of the leximax swr. The swr < on X satis￿es all properties except
WPC.
For an example violating only IBP￿, de￿ne < on X in the following way:
81x;1 y 2 X
1x ￿ 1y , 9~ T ￿ 1 s.t. 8T ￿ ~ T : 1￿ xT = 1￿ yT,
and
1x ￿ 1y , 9~ T ￿ 1 s.t. 8T ￿ ~ T : 9t 2 f1;:::;Tg ￿ us = ￿ vs (81 ￿ s < t) and ￿ ut > ￿ vt.
< on X is a swr (i.e., the w-leximin swr). It follows that the swr < on X is not
an extension of the leximax swr. The swr < on X satis￿es all properties except
IBP￿.
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